Geopolitical shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean.  Security Policy Brief No. 43, February 2013 by Nopens, Patrick.
  1 
Geopolitical Shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean 
Patrick Nopens 
 
Three major geopolitical events are putting 
the  stability  of  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
at  risk.  Most  of  the  region  is  in  a  deep 
monetary  and  economic  crisis.  The  Arab 
Spring is causing turmoil in the Levant and 
the Maghreb. Gas and oil discoveries, if not 
well managed, could further destabilise the 
region.  At  the  same  time,  Russia  and 
Turkey are staging a comeback. In the face 
of these challenges, the EU approaches the 
Greek  sovereign  debt  crisis  nearly 
exclusively from a financial and economic 
viewpoint.  This  brief  argues  that  the  EU 
has to develop a comprehensive strategy for 
the  region,  complementing  its  existing 
multilateral  regional  framework  with 
bilateral agreements in order to secure its 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
AN EU WITHOUT AN OVERARCHING 
STRATEGY FOR THE EASTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Usually, European analysts approach the Greek 
sovereign  debt  crisis  in  a  one-dimensional 
manner.  They  consider  the  continuation  of 
Greece’s  EU-membership  exclusively  in  the 
context of its ability to address its debt crisis. 
They do not take into account the geostrategic 
importance  of  Greece  in  three  crucial 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
geopolitical  events  that  are  destabilising  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean.  Firstly,  most  of  the 
region  is  already  in  a  deep  monetary  and 
economic crisis. Secondly, the Arab Spring is 
causing  chaos  in  the  Middle  East  and  the 
Maghreb; Egypt, Syria and Libya are in turmoil 
and their new end states are far from certain. 
Thirdly, gas and oil discoveries, if not properly 
managed, could further destabilise the region. 
Furthermore,  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  is 
showing no signs of abating while the Iranian 
nuclear  crisis  is  destabilising  not  only  the 
whole region, but is also causing confrontation 
between leading out of area players.  
 
In  addition,  major  powers  are  competing 
for  a  redistribution  of  power  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean. The United States, and in its 
wake  Israel,  has  been  the  key  player  for  60 
years. The EU as such is not acting as a major 
player,  but  members  such  as  the  United 
Kingdom  and  France  have  been  involved  in 
the  area  for  decades,  if  not  centuries. 
Moreover,  EU  members  Greece  and  Cyprus 
are  part  of  the  region.  Russia,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  attempting  a  comeback,  having 
abandoned the Mediterranean two decades ago 
after  the  implosion  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Turkey  is  also  staging  a  return  as  an 
independent player after nearly a century since 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
No. 43 
  February 2013   2 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
Other major and regional powers approach 
these events in a comparatively comprehensive 
way. Conversely, just like the EU lacks a grand 
strategy,  it  does  not  have  an  overarching 
strategy or an effective political project for the 
Eastern Mediterranean. Kristina Kausch puts it 
bluntly:  “[…]  any  holistic  Euro-Mediterranean 
integration  policy  needs  to  start  from  shared  political 
ambitions. But over the past decade EU-Med policies 
have  been  littering  the  region  with  technocratic 
institutional structures and instruments with insufficient 
political backing for their lofty mandates.”
1 Both the 
Barcelona  Process  and  the  Union  for  the 
Mediterranean  were  set  up  in  an  attempt  to 
create a framework for institutionalised Euro-
Mediterranean  multilateralism,  avoiding 
politically  sensitive  issues.  In  due  course, 
institutional  structures  would  generate  a 
political framework for cooperation.
2 However, 
Euro-Mediterranean  multilateralism  never  got 
off  the  ground.  The  heterogeneity  of  the 
region, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the  transformation  by  the  West  of  the  Arab 
world  into  a  matter  almost  exclusively  of 
security  after  9/11,  prevented  it  from  getting 
off to a good start. 
 
More worryingly, the European Union is in 
retreat  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  The 
economic crisis in the EU has undermined its 
position  and  the  appeal  of  the  European 
model. If Greece and Cyprus were to leave the 
Eurozone,  even  if  they  would  remain  EU 
members, this would be perceived as the EU 
disengaging  from  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 
Moreover,  Turkey  has  all  but  given  up  its 
ambition for EU membership. Finally, the Arab 
Spring renders it harder for European countries 
to promote their brand of secularism across the 
region. 
 
The  situation  in  Greece  is  particularly 
worrisome  for  the  EU.  The  geopolitical 
consequences  of  a  Grexit  would  be  just  as 
profound  as  the  financial  and  economic 
ramifications.
3 Greece lies on the geostrategic 
crossroad  between  the  Black  Sea  and  the 
Mediterranean,  and  between  Europe  and  the 
Middle  East.  Greece  is  poised  to  become  a 
significant  transit  route  for  gas  and  oil  from 
Russia, the Caspian and the newly discovered 
energy sources in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Furthermore, together with Cyprus, Greece is 
the most south-easterly outpost of the EU in a 
region of considerable instability.  
 
However,  the  EU  remains  the  largest 
economy  in  the  world,  and  it  would  be 
imprudent to write off Europe’s influence in 
its  neighbourhood.  Yet  the  “EU’s  unipolar 
moment  of  the  1990’s  has  come  to  an  end”.
4 T h e  
time the EU could invite others to join its set 
of  rules  in  exchange  of  a  privileged 
institutionalised  relationship  applicable  to  an 
entire  region  belongs  to  the  past.  Therefore, 
relationships will have to be negotiated more 
often on a bilateral than on a regional basis, 
complementing multilateral frameworks. 
 
The  Eastern  Mediterranean  undoubtedly 
has to remain a key interest for the EU. It is a 
highly  unstable  region  where  its  interests 
intersect with those of several major powers, 
namely the United States, Russia and Turkey. 
Furthermore,  the  recently  discovered 
hydrocarbon  resources  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  could  free  Europe  from 
overdependence on Russian gas. 
 
With respect to Turkey, the positions taken 
up  by  the  EU  expressing  unconditional 
solidarity with Israel and Cyprus regarding the 
Exclusive Economic Zones around Cyprus will 
impede  any  rapid  settlement  of  the  issue  of 
exploiting hydrocarbon resources in the area.
5 
The alliance between the EU and Turkey in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, which survived for the 
last six decades, is seriously being put to the 
test. In fact, a realignment of alliances is taking 
place.  Nicosia  and  Tel  Aviv  intend  to 
cooperate  closely  in  exploring  and  exporting 
gas, and in the safety of the gas rigs. Greece, 
Cyprus,  Israel  and  the  United  States  have 
enhanced military collaboration. From the 26th   3 
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of March to the 5th of April 2012, a military 
exercise Noble Dina took place in the Eastern 
Mediterranean  involving  the  navies  and  air 
forces of the United States, Greece and Israel. 
The scenarios included repelling enemy attacks 
on  offshore  rigs.  They  took  place  as  Greece, 
Cyprus and Israel signed an energy agreement. 
Since  2010,  Greece  and  Israel  have 
strengthened  their  defence  cooperation  after 
Turkey  downgraded  diplomatic  relations 
following the raid on the Gaza flotilla in May 
2010.  In  September  2011,  both  countries 
signed  a  defence  agreement,  upgrading  their 
defence and military collaboration. 
 
With regard to Russia, the EU should take 
the necessary measures to provide more energy 
independence. Therefore, it should be actively 
involved in assuring that the energy deposits in 
the Eastern Mediterranean are managed in such 
a way as to supplement a Third Energy Corridor 
while avoiding tensions with Turkey.  
 
In  this  not  particularly  promising  context, 
Greece and Cyprus, are indispensable from a 
geopolitical  point  of  view  to  maintain  and 
further develop the EU’s position in the area. 
Greece  has  been  instrumental,  if  not  always 
forthcoming, for the EU and NATO in several 
foreign  policy  areas  such  as  relations  with 
Turkey, the Cyprus problem, the Balkans and 
the Black Sea, and in key issues such as energy 
security and immigration. Furthermore, Greece 
has  always  had  close  relations  with  the  Arab 
world and the Levant.
6 However, the sovereign 
debt crisis has struck a serious blow to Greece’s 
standing in its neighbourhood and within the 
EU.  Not  only  has  Greece  lost  influence  in 
these  areas,  but  it  is  also  turning  more 
nationalistic.
7 It would, therefore, be imprudent 
to  assume  that  these  economic  woes  will 
compel Greece to become more flexible in any 
of these matters.  
 
THE UNITED STATES, WINDING DOWN 
PERHAPS, BUT NOT LEAVING 
The United States conceives the Mediterranean, 
not  as  a  sea,  but  as  “a  highway”  for  the 
projection of US power “deep into the heart of the 
land  mass  of  Eurasia  and  Africa”.
8  Through 
NATO and its alliance with Israel, the United 
States  dominated  the  region  during  the  Cold 
War and continues to do so today. The United 
States  considers  Turkey  and  Israel  its  most 
valuable  allies  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 
Hence, the tensions between Israel and Turkey 
are unwelcome. Furthermore, the United States 
has  played  a  key  role  in  decreasing  Europe’s 
dependence on Russian gas and considers the 
hydrocarbon  resources  in  the  region,  among 
other things, as potentially contributing to this 
goal. It is deeply involved in the exploitation of 
gas and oil in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
leading offshore drilling contractor is the Noble 
Corporation,  an  American  company  with 
substantial Israeli interests. 
 
Much  is  being  made  of  the  so-called 
American  strategic  pivot,  recognizing  that  the 
dominant  issues  of  the  21
st  century  will  be 
decided in the Asia-Pacific. Some analysts see 
this  as  an  American  disengagement  from  the 
Mediterranean. Indeed, according to Secretary 
FIGURE  1:  GAS  FIELDS  IN  THE 
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
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of Defence Leon Panetta, the pivot strategy will 
rebalance  American  naval  assets  between  the 
Pacific  and  the  Atlantic  from  today’s  roughly 
50/50  split  to  60/40  by  2020.
9 H o w e v e r ,  t h e  
strategic  guidance  issued  by  the  Obama 
administration  in  January  2012,  identifies  “the 
primary  loci  of  these  threats  are  South  Asia  and  the 
Middle East”. It continues to state “to support these 
objectives [in the Middle East], the United States will 
continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military 
presence in – and support of – partner nations in and 
around this region”.
10 Moreover, access to Central 
Asia  remains  important  in  American  policy 
toward  China.  Therefore,  it  seems  improbable 
that  American  interest  in  the  region  will  be 
winding down in the near or medium future. 
 
RUSSIA, BACK AFTER TWO DECADES 
Since 1769, Russia has remained an active player 
in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  except  for  short 
intervals  due  to  external  causes.  After  the 
American intervention in Lebanon in 1958, the 
Soviet Union deployed a forward Mediterranean 
Squadron of the Black Sea Fleet and obtained 
some naval facilities in Arab countries. Although 
it never was able to challenge the US 6
th Fleet, 
during  the  Six-Day  War  and  the  Yom  Kippur 
War,  this  presence  signalled  a  strong  Soviet 
commitment  to  their  Arab  allies.  When  the 
Soviet Navy had to abandon its bases in Egypt 
in 1977, the Syrian port of Tartus became the 
main Soviet support base in the Mediterranean. 
In 1991, the Mediterranean Squadron ceased to 
exist,  but  since  2007,  the  Russian  Fleet  again 
regularly  sends  small  task  forces  into  the 
Mediterranean.  Tartus  is  the  only  remaining 
Russian naval facility outside the former Soviet 
Union. It only consists of one floating dock in 
working order and some other support facilities, 
most of them in disrepair. However, according 
to  the  Commander  of  the  Russian  Fleet  Vice 
Admiral Viktor Chirkov, “the base is vital for us, 
it worked, and will continue to act”.
11 
 
Although Russia has been marginalised in the 
Mediterranean for the last two decades and its 
military  presence  is  still  negligible  today,  it  is 
staging a comeback. Russia’s main goal is to 
recover its influence in a region that is rapidly 
gaining importance because of both its energy 
reserves  and  key  strategic  position.  Russia  is 
systematically  pursuing  a  policy  of  economic 
and  geostrategic  penetration,  in  particular  in 
Greece and Cyprus, and of containing Turkey’s 
ascent.  It  is  also  making  overtures  to  Egypt 
and Iraq, and continues supporting Syria and 
Iran.  Finally,  relations  with  Israel  are 
improving,  culminating  in  a  deal  with 
Gazprom in July 2012 on gas extraction.
12 In 
short,  in  the  long  run  and  in  the  broader 
region of the Middle East, Russia seems intent 
on  changing  the  regional  order,  diminishing 
US  predominance,  limiting  an  increase  of 
Turkey’s  and  the  EU’s  influence,  and 
reclaiming  its  former  status  in  a  renewed 
geopolitical context.
13 
 
The Greek-Cypriot financial crisis and the 
growing  energy  interests  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean are providing Russia with new 
opportunities  to  restore  its  influence. 
Therefore,  the  EU  should  be  aware t h a t  
approaching the Greek and Cypriot sovereign 
debt crisis exclusively in the light of financial 
criteria opens the door to Russia enhancing its 
influence in both these members of the Union. 
In 2011, Russia granted Cyprus a loan of €2.5 
billion.  In  2012,  Nicosia  requested  a  second 
loan  that  could  amount  to  €5  billion.  This 
financial support is not only aimed at securing 
the vast sums of money Russian oligarchs have 
deposited in Cypriot banks.
14 It is also linked 
to demands for a key role in the development 
of Cyprus’ prospective energy boom.  
 
Indeed, Russia’s energy policy is aimed at 
blocking  any  alternative  to  its  control  over 
Europe’s  gas  supplies.  This  not  only  implies 
attempting  to  monopolise  the  infrastructure 
that delivers gas from the Caspian and Central 
Asia to Europe, but also obtaining a key role in 
the  exploitation  of  energy  resources  of  the 
Eastern Mediterranean.   
   5 
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Gazprom, Neguzneft and the Sintez Group 
are interested in participating in the privatisation 
of the Greek gas supplier DEPA and the natural 
gas  transmission  network  operator  DESFA.
15 
This  would  not  only  strengthen  Russian 
influence in Greece. It would also give Russia a 
say  in  Greece’s  pipeline  system  that  will 
transport gas from the Caspian and Central Asia 
to the Adriatic for further distribution to Italy 
and  beyond.  For  that  reason,  Russia  is 
contesting the EU’s Third Energy Package, which 
would  restrict  Gazprom’s  control  over 
European pipelines.  
 
However, energy is not the only link between 
Russia  and  Greece.  Western  Europeans  rarely 
acknowledge that the Russian-Greek connection 
goes far deeper than energy politics alone. Russia 
has traditionally been the custodian of Orthodox 
Christianity and has supported its co-religionists 
in  their  struggle  for  independence  from  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  After  all,  Russians  consider 
Moscow  the  Third  Rome  since  the  fall  of 
Constantinople, and Russia the continuation of 
Byzantine religion and culture.
16 
 
Enhancing  its  influence  in  Greece  and 
Cyprus also strengthens Russia’s position vis-à-
vis Turkey. It not only makes it more difficult 
for Turkey to coerce Cyprus, it also undermines 
Turkey’s plans to take part in the exploitation of 
Cypriot energy assets. Moreover, it strengthens 
Russia’s bargaining position towards Turkey in 
their  bilateral  energy  dealings  threatening  to 
undermine Turkey’s ambition as an energy hub. 
Finally,  Cyprus  lies  across  the  approaches  to 
most  of  Turkey’s  Mediterranean  ports,  which 
should  not  only  concern  Turkey,  but  also  the 
United States and even NATO as a whole.
17 
 
A  final  area  of  contention  with  Turkey  is 
Russia’s reluctance to act against the repression 
by  Assad  in  Syria.  Most  analysts  mention  the 
arms trade and the naval base of Tartus as the 
main  reasons  for  Russia’s  support  for  Assad. 
However, fear of popular revolt in Russia and 
nostalgia for its former status as a superpower 
seem a more feasible explanation. Russia risks 
losing all its influence in Syria when the Assad 
regime collapses. Yet if Syria falls apart, Russia 
can hope to retain its influence in the Allawite 
entity  strategically  situated  along  the 
Mediterranean coastline.  
 
TURKEY, BACK AS AN INDEPENDENT 
PLAYER 
Turkey  aims  at  being  the  leading  Muslim 
power  in  the  region.  It  occupies  a  unique 
geopolitical  position,  controlling  the  land 
bridges linking both the Caucasus and Europe 
with  the  Middle  East.  The  Turkish  Straits 
command the passage between the Black Sea 
and the Mediterranean. Politically it is the most 
advanced  Muslim  country  with  a  lay 
democracy and offers an alternative model for 
Arab countries emerging from the upheaval of 
the Arab Spring. 
 
During the Cold, War Turkey was a loyal 
and  unconditional  ally  of  the  United  States. 
America  based  its  position  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean on its alliance with Turkey and 
Israel. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire, its 
cooperation with Israel and its membership of 
NATO isolated Turkey from the Arab world. 
 
After  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  Turkey’s 
foreign  policy  became  more  independent. 
When  the  AKP  came  to  power  in  2002, 
Turkey began redefining its foreign policy in a 
more  fundamental  way,  calling  the  new 
approach  “zero  problems  with  neighbours”.  The 
premise of this policy is that Turkey is one of 
the few countries with a “central role”. Turkey 
has the potential to play a leading role in the 
Caucasus,  the  Middle  East,  the  Balkans,  the 
Black  Sea,  the  Persian  Gulf  and  the 
Mediterranean, due to its geographic position. 
In  order  to  develop  its  full  potential  on  the 
international scene, Turkey has first to resolve 
its  internal  and  external  problems. 
Domestically, it has to find a durable solution 
to the Kurdish problem. On the international 
scene,  Turkey  has  to  pursue  a  policy  of   6 
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reconciliation with its traditional adversaries.  
 
The goal is to allow Turkey to conduct an 
independent foreign policy. The turning point 
came  when  Ankara  refused  to  let  the  United 
States make use of its territory for the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, demonstrating to Washington 
that Turkey’s unconditional support could not 
be taken for granted anymore. This was not a 
turn towards Islam and away from NATO. For 
instance,  Turkey  is  determined  to  play  a 
significant role in NATO’s missile defence, and 
it requested Patriot air defence batteries from 
NATO allies on its territory against a potential 
Syrian SCUD-threat. 
 
Nonetheless,  “zero  problems  with  neighbours” 
has not delivered the expected results. Turkey’s 
relations  with  Israel,  Syria,  Russia,  Greece, 
Cyprus, and Iran have all taken a turn for the 
worse. “Zero problems with neighbours”, although 
the  result  of  a  geopolitical  analysis,  was 
originally  supposed  to  be  based  primarily  on 
soft  power.  Meanwhile,  however,  Turkey’s 
economic  power  has  increased  significantly. 
Moreover, now that instability in the region is 
on the rise and other players are just as openly 
pursuing  their  national  interests,  Turkey  is 
resorting to more traditional power politics.
18 
 
Tensions  between  Turkey  and  Israel  have 
been  rising  since  2008.  Turkey  invested 
significant  diplomatic  capital  in  mediating 
between Israel and Syria after the AKP came to 
power.  Turkish  Prime  Minister  Erdoğan  felt 
personally  stabbed  in  the  back  when  Israel 
mounted  an  offensive  against  Gaza  in 
December  2008,  on  the  eve  of  the  start  of 
Turkish  brokered  direct  peace  talks  between 
Syria  and  Israel.
19  From  that  point,  relations 
with Israel deteriorated, culminating in Israel’s 
refusal  to  apologise  for  the  attack  on  an 
international  flotilla  heading  for  Gaza  and 
killing  nine  Turkish  citizens.  Turkey 
downgraded  diplomatic  relations  with  Israel 
and put military cooperation on hold. Turkey 
now  supports  Palestine  becoming  an 
independent  state  and  committed  itself  to 
guarantee freedom of navigation in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
20 The discovery of energy fields 
in the area will not simplify relations between 
the two countries. 
 
Initially,  distancing  itself  from  Israel 
heightened  Turkey’s  standing  in  the  Arab 
world. Nevertheless, Turkey reacted cautiously 
to the Arab Spring. It supported the ouster of 
Mubarak  in  Egypt,  but  in  Libya  Turkey 
hesitated at first because of its economic ties 
and  of  the  25,000  Turks  living  there.  Still, 
Turkey sees the Arab Spring as an opportunity 
to enhance its influence in the region on the 
strength of the so-called Turkish Model. To the 
protesters,  the  Turkish  moderate  Islamic 
democracy allowing for religious expression in 
politics, could serve as an example. However, 
President  Morsi’s  diplomatic  success  as  the 
main architect of the cease-fire deal in Gaza in 
November  2012  reveals  that  Egypt  is  not 
willing to give up its aspiration to be the main 
Islamic power in the Eastern Mediterranean to 
Turkey.
21 
 
In  Syria,  Turkey  initially  tried  to  engage 
with President Assad. Before the Arab Spring, 
Turkey considered Syria its closest ally in the 
Arab  world,  especially  since  Iraq  pursues 
increasingly  pro-Shia  policies  under  the 
influence  of  Iran.  Tensions  increased  when 
refugees began pouring into Turkey and Syria 
brought  down  a  Turkish  reconnaissance 
aircraft  in  July  2012.  Now,  Turkey  considers 
the Assad regime a liability and is the principal 
channel of support to the rebels. The civil war 
in  Syria  shattered  Turkey’s  “zero  problems  with 
neighbours”  policy  as  fighting  is  increasingly 
spilling  over  and  highlighting  the  power 
struggle  between  Sunni  and  Shiite.  Finally, 
instability  in  Syria  and  a  weak  central 
government in Iraq have a direct impact on the 
Kurdish problem in Turkey. 
 
With  Russia,  energy  dominates  relations. 
Turkey  is  doing  everything  in  its  power  to   7 
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become a true energy hub for supplying gas and 
oil to Europe from diversified sources, using its 
geographic  position  between  multiple  energy 
suppliers and the European market. The EU’s 
Southern Corridor includes several projects on 
Turkish soil. Turkey already plays a vital role in 
the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  pipeline,  in  Nabucco 
and South Stream, but it also hopes to play an 
essential part in supplying Caspian gas via the 
Trans-Anatolian pipeline.
22 In addition, Turkey 
wants to get involved in transporting gas and 
oil from Iraq, Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz-II field, 
Turkmenistan  and  the  newly  discovered  gas 
fields  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  Turkey 
signed a gas deal with Azerbaijan in October 
2011, not only providing gas for its domestic 
market, but also sending gas to Europe through 
its pipelines, reducing Europe’s dependence on 
South  Stream.  These  alternative  pipelines 
bypassing Russia will not only cause Gazprom 
to lose substantial revenues, but also diminish 
Russia’s  economic  and  political  leverage  on 
Europe.  Russian  ambition  to  dominate  the 
European gas market is taking it on a collision 
course with Turkey. This is already apparent in 
Cyprus where Russia supports Nicosia against 
Ankara’s  moves  to  block  Cyprus’  exploration 
of offshore gas fields. However, energy is not 
the only area of tension between Moscow and 
Ankara. The Caucasus, where Russia is trying 
to stage a comeback in Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
where  Turkey  has  direct  interests,  could  well 
become a future area of conflict. Relations with 
an Armenia protected by Russia remain tense. 
Turkey’s  willingness  to  play  a  key  role  in 
NATO’s Missile Defence is another cause of 
disagreement.  Turkey  and  Russia  are  also  at 
loggerheads  over  Syria,  especially  now  that 
Turkey is directly involved because of the spill 
over of the conflict. 
 
Relations with Greece and Cyprus reached a 
new low when Turkey insisted on participating 
in  the  exploitation  of  gas  off  the  coast  of 
Cyprus.  The  new  US  sponsored  alliance 
between  Greece,  Cyprus  and  Israel  does  not 
bode well for Turkey.  
Nor was “zero problems with neighbours” able 
to  improve  relations  with  Iran.  Turkey’s 
diplomatic initiatives with regard to Iran have 
not met with success. In the spring of 2010, 
Turkey  and  Brazil  attempted  to  broker  a 
nuclear  fuel-swap,  resulting  in  the  Teheran 
Declaration.  However,  the  United  States, 
France  and  Russia  rejected  it,  embarrassing 
Turkey diplomatically.  
 
Notwithstanding these setbacks, Turkey is a 
beacon of stability among Islamic countries in 
the  region.  However,  it  will  also  have  to 
revitalise  the  policy  of  “zero  problems  with 
neighbours”; good relations with Israel need to 
be  re-established  and  a  solution  found  to 
unblock the Cyprus question.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Political  reluctance  to  launch  grand  new 
strategies is on the rise in the EU, due to the 
economic crisis.  
 
The EU continues to analyse the events in 
the Eastern Mediterranean almost exclusively 
from  an  economic  and  financial  viewpoint. 
Outside of these issues, Europe seems only to 
be  roused  by  challenges  that  threaten  the 
immediate social and economic fabric of the 
Union,  such  as  migration.  The  geopolitical 
importance of the region hardly plays any role, 
preventing  the  EU  to  develop  a 
comprehensive strategy.  
 
Yet the Eastern Mediterranean remains of 
paramount interest to the EU. On the positive 
side,  it  promises  to  reduce  energy  dependence 
on Russia. On the worrying side, the outcomes 
of  the  Arab  Spring  and  the  economic  and 
financial crisis are far from certain, and could 
result  in  the  EU’s  southern  flank  mired  in 
instability for a protracted period. 
 
Therefore,  it  is  paramount  that  the  EU 
develops  a  comprehensive  strategy,  with 
positive  and  proactive  action  addressing 
economic issues, energy interests and the Arab   8 
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2012 and the accession talks that remain stalled 
are  illustrative  of  the  strained  relationship 
between  the  EU  and  Turkey.  In  view  of 
Turkey’s  growing  exasperation  with  its 
exclusion from the EU, its rise as a regional 
power,  and  its  role  as  an  energy  hub,  the 
relationship between the EU and Turkey needs 
to be redefined.  
 
Lastly,  the  EU’s  existing  multilateral 
institutions in the Mediterranean should not be 
marginalised,  but  they  should  be 
complemented with a more flexible approach, 
based on shared interests. This implies that the 
EU should accept the Arab countries as equal 
partners,  with  whom  it  does  not  only  enter 
into  agreements  in  a  multilateral  framework, 
but  is  also  prepared  to  conclude  substantial 
bilateral agreements. 
Spring.  
 
An  economically  viable  exploitation  of 
recently discovered hydrocarbon deposits in the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  requires  progress  in 
solving  three  protracted  conflicts,  namely  the 
Middle  East  peace  process,  the  Cypriot 
question  and  the  Greek-Turkish  rivalry.  The 
EU  needs  to  find  a  delicate  balance  between 
preserving  its  relationship  with  Israel, 
supporting  Greece  and  Cyprus  without 
alienating  Turkey,  and  containing  Russian 
influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Failure 
to make substantial progress in these problem 
areas  will  not  only  jeopardise  fully  exploiting 
the energy deposits, but will also heighten the 
risk of international conflict.  
 
Moreover,  Turkey’s  refusal  to  talk  to  the 
Cypriot EU Presidency in the second half of 
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